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The devil’s in the detail: The
hidden costs of private
retirement incomes policy
Adam Stebbing
Australian governments have shifted the focus of public policy onto the
private sector in recent decades. Retirement incomes policy offers an
important case study of this shift as a major target of efforts to privatise
social provision. Rather than involving cutbacks to public provision,
the privatisation of retirement incomes has extended occupational wel-
fare offered as a condition of employment and fiscal welfare delivered
via the tax system (Titmuss 1958, p. 42). In fact, the introduction of
compulsory occupational superannuation represents the largest trans-
fer of social provision to the private sector in recent memory. This
scheme has established private super as a secondary source of retire-
ment savings for most Australians and channelled record investments
into private super funds.
The unprecedented growth of private super has stimulated debate
about the economic and distributive impacts of private retirement in-
comes policy. This policy shift continues to be justified as a means to
promote the key economic objectives of containing public expenditure,
particularly over the long term as the population ages, and advanc-
ing national savings. That said, the capacity of current policy settings
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to meet these goals, although often assumed, has been challenged by
recent evidence. At the same time, the distributive effects of private
retirement incomes policy have become of mounting concern, with at-
tention focusing on the tax treatment of super and how private super
has shifted the risk profile of retirement incomes. This ‘risk shift’ is
particularly concerning because of the financialisation of private su-
per, which has involved super funds reorganising their operations to
maximise short-term profit and minimise fund exposure to long-term
risk (Cutler & Waine 2001, p. 100). The financialisation of private super
reflects a broader institutional reorganisation of the superannuation
market, brought about by the demutualisation of several large not-
for-profit operators and the growing market share held by for-profit
providers including banks and other financial entities.
This chapter explores both the fiscal impact and distributive effects
of private retirement incomes policy to better understand the strengths
and limitations of recent developments. The fiscal impact of private re-
tirement incomes policy is gauged by surveying the available evidence
on its capacity to meet key policy goals. The distributive effect of pri-
vate retirement incomes policy is examined by analysing current policy
settings and the impact of private super on the risk profile of retire-
ment incomes. After reviewing the evidence, I conclude by canvassing
the prospects for reform in this critical policy domain.
Retirement incomes in Australia: A two-tiered system
The Australian retirement incomes system is a mixed economy that
can be understood as a two-tiered system of social risk management
(see Stebbing & Spies-Butcher 2010). The first and primary tier col-
lectively pools protection from the social risk of income insecurity in
old age. This tier consists of the publicly financed age pension (and
related benefits) that excludes the wealthy through means tests. Provid-
ing a modest income stream, the age pension’s full fortnightly rate was
$776.70 for singles and $585.50 (each) for couples in January 2015 (De-
partment of Human Services 2015). The pension forms the bedrock of
the retirement incomes system, covering 76 percent of the population
aged 65 years and over (AIHW 2013, p. 238).
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In contrast, the second-tier individualises protection from income
insecurity in retirement, through private investments managed in in-
dividual accounts. This tier mainly consists of private superannuation
and voluntary savings, both of which are financed by contributions
from individuals (or made on their behalf). Lacking the redistributive
mechanism typical of European social insurance schemes, private super
benefits are predominantly calculated in relation to individual con-
tributions and investment returns. Because the government does not
appear to finance the second tier (despite the generous concessions
discussed below), retirees who draw retirement incomes from private
sources are widely perceived to be self-funded (and are referred to
as ‘self-funded retirees’). Private super has become an important sec-
ondary source of retirement income and is now held by around 90
percent of income earners (Nielson & Harris 2009, p. 9).
The Commonwealth government supports both tiers of the retire-
ment incomes system. The first tier consists of income transfers directly
financed by the Commonwealth, such as the age pension, rent assis-
tance and benefits provided to Concession Card holders (AIHW 2011,
p. 11). Accounting for most expenditure on the first tier, the age pen-
sion cost $42.3 billion in 2014–15 (Australian Government 2014). The
second-tier is supported via indirect means; this support includes reg-
ulations and tax expenditures, which provide tax payers with selective
tax breaks. The major regulatory scheme is the Superannuation Guar-
antee Scheme, which mandates that employers pay nine percent of their
employees’ wages into private super. As contributions were increased
from three to nine percent between 1992 and 2002 and will only in-
crease to 12 percent in 2025, this scheme is not set to mature until at
least 2050 (assuming a working life from 18 to 67 years of age). This
scheme channels tens of billions of dollars into private super each year,
without mandating financial contributions from the government. The
super tax concessions discount the tax levied on super at all three stages
of the super income stream – when employers make super contribu-
tions on their employees’ behalf, when individuals earn interest on their
super investments and when individuals withdraw benefits. These tax
expenditures account for most public spending on the second tier, cost-
ing $32.1 billion of revenue forgone in 2013–14 (Treasury 2014). And,
salary-sacrificing arrangements exist for employees who forgo income
in return for their employers making additional contributions to super
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funds (which have the benefit of being subsidised by the tax expendi-
tures).
The shift to private retirement incomes: A brief policy history
The two-tiered structure of retirement incomes policy has a long his-
tory, with the Commonwealth establishing the foundations of both tiers
in the early 20th century. The age pension was the first social pro-
gram established after Federation and the super tax concessions formed
part of the first federal income tax. Despite these early origins, private
retirement incomes policy played a minor role for most of the 20th
century. The current emphasis of retirement incomes policy on private
superannuation is a novel development. This section outlines the major
developments in retirement incomes policy and explains how this shift
coincided with the financialisation of private super.
The age pension
At Federation, age pensions received in-principle support from all ma-
jor political parties and were one of only two social provisions explicitly
identified in the Constitution. Political support for a national age pen-
sion was buoyed by the pre-existence of colonial and state schemes in
NSW and Victoria, as well as concerns about aged poverty following
the economic downturn in the 1890s (Dixon 1977, p. 22). Despite fea-
turing on their agendas, early federal parliaments failed to introduce a
national age pension because of fiscal constraints that stemmed from
unresolved issues with the states about the distribution of taxing re-
sponsibilities (Kewley 1973, p. 67). After the Deakin minority govern-
ment developed a means of skirting these fiscal constraints in 1908,
Labor made support for increasing taxes conditional on the establish-
ment of an age pension (Kewley 1973, p. 72). The government proved
receptive to this request as it relied on Labor’s greater numbers to retain
office (Sawer 1956, p. 71). Legislation for the age pension was swiftly in-
troduced to parliament in 1908 and passed into law with support from
the major parties.
The age pension marked a watershed in retirement incomes policy,
providing a modest income stream for eligible members of the popu-
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lation aged 65 years and over. Like earlier state schemes, the pension
was financed out of consolidated revenue and means tests established
eligibility. The age pension’s design reflected a compromise between
Deakin’s Protectionists and Labor. Labor supported a universal age
pension and opposed social insurance (Kewley 1973, p. 83). The Pro-
tectionists (and Free Traders) opposed universalism because of its cost
(Kewley 1973, p. 83). They also rejected social insurance because of
perceptions that it would expand direct taxation and was unsuitable
to Australia’s English heritage at the time (Kewley 1973, p. 82). Labor
agreed to support the means-tested age pension backed by the Pro-
tectionists, but indicated the intention to establish a universalist age
pension when the Commonwealth’s financial position improved (Kew-
ley 1973, p. 82). At its introduction, the age pension covered a small
minority of the population since average life expectancy was less than
60 years (AIHW 2009, p. 83). Despite early reforms that reduced the
eligibility age for women from 65 to 60 years and exempted the family
home from the means test, the age pension was only received by around
one-third of the eligible age group by the 1930s (Kewley 1973, p. 22).1
Over the following 50 years, the age pension became established
as the primary retirement incomes policy. On the one hand, the age
pension’s role was firmed up by the failure of alternative policy pro-
posals to take hold. After reversing their opposition to social insurance
in 1913 (following the establishment of such a scheme in the United
Kingdom in 1912), the non-Labor parties introduced several proposals
to parliament before the Second World War but were unable to garner
the support necessary to implement them (Dixon 1977, p. 43). Labor
continued to support a universal pension and remained opposed to so-
cial insurance over this period. On the other, the age pension became
entrenched as coverage gradually rose with rising life expectancy and
the liberalisation of the entitlement criteria. Liberal and Labor gov-
1 The family home was exempted from the means test of the age pension in 1912
(Nielson & Harris 2009). This critical decision, which was extended later by a
similar exemption in the Capital Gains Tax, has become an entrenched feature of
the Australian tax and transfer system. These exemptions for owner-occupier
housing has created perverse incentives to over-invest in housing, as well as to use
super benefits on housing improvements and mortgage payments (for more on
housing policy see Groenhart & Gurran, this volume).
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ernments both liberalised the age pension between the 1950s and
mid-1970s. This trend culminated in the Whitlam’s Labor government
abolition of the means test for those aged more than 70 years in 1975
and the move by the Fraser Liberal government to remove assets from
the means test in 1979 (Bateman & Piggott 2003, p. 31).
However, the age pension has increasingly been targeted since the
late 1970s. Reversing the direction of its earlier policy, the Fraser gov-
ernment froze the non-means-tested component of the age pension for
recipients aged more than 70 years to reduce government spending
(Daniels 2011, p. 35). The Hawke Labor government re-established
both income and assets tests for all recipients in the mid-1980s as
part of its efforts to redirect spending to new programs like Medicare
(Daniels 2011, p. 35). The Hawke government also announced that it
would increase the age pension by indexing it to 25 percent of male
full-time average earnings (rather than index it to the Consumer Price
Index) (Whiteford 2004, p. 85). Although this goal was mostly achieved
from 1990, this reflected a fall in male average earnings and the reform
was not legislated at this time (Whiteford 2004, p. 85). The Howard Lib-
eral–National Coalition government largely retained the policy settings
that it inherited, but enacted legislation to index the age pension at 25
percent of male full-time average earnings in 1997 and liberalised the
means test as compensation for the Goods and Services Tax in 2000
(Daniels 2011, p. 36). And, the Rudd Labor government increased the
rate of the pension to 27.7 percent of male average earnings (an increase
of $60 per fortnight for singles), while tightening the means test and
lifting the eligibility to those aged 67 years by 2019 (APL 2009, p. 171).
Subsequently, the Abbott Coalition government (2013–) proposed rais-
ing the eligibility age of the pension to 70 years by 2035 and reducing
the payment by indexing it to inflation rather than average male wages
(Australian Government 2014). A century after it was introduced, the
age pension remains the primary source of retirement income for most
retirees despite the recent shifts to targeting and private provision.
The rise of compulsory private superannuation and the super tax
concessions
While compulsory superannuation has recent origins, the Fisher Labor
government established the super tax concessions when it introduced
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the income tax to fund Australia’s role in the First World War in 1915
(Harris 2002, p. 180). Applying to the three stages of the super income
stream, these tax concessions provided tax discounts that increased
with the amount of income earned and super held. But, at the time they
were introduced these tax concessions also had a low budgetary cost
because income tax was levied on a minority of high-income earners
and fewer than five percent of workers held super (Olsberg 1997, p. 58).
As minor provisions of a new income tax system, it is unsurprising
that the inequality of the super tax concessions escaped controversy
when introduced. Moreover, these tax concessions reflected the prac-
tice of not taxing mutual aid organisations, as not-for-profit life insur-
ance funds administered most super schemes at the time (Rafter 1986,
p. 232). It also streamlined the Commonwealth income tax with similar
provisions for super in the states’ schemes (Harris 2002 p. 177). How-
ever, even if they had had a larger cost, these tax concessions are still
likely to have had a low profile because tax expenditures were not re-
ported in either the Budget or other reports of public finance. In fact,
reflecting their low profile, the super tax concessions were not subject
to systematic review until the Asprey Tax Review of 1975 – around 60
years after their introduction.
The secondary role of superannuation grew steadily over the
mid-20th century and this coincided with a shift in the composition of
the super industry. Super came to cover 32 percent of the workforce by
1974, with coverage concentrated amongst men on higher incomes in
managerial, professional and public sector roles (ABS 1976). The rising
coverage of public sector employees was the result of governments es-
tablishing their own super schemes for their employees from the 1920s
(Bateman & Piggott 2003, p. 31). The coverage of public sector super
funds gradually expanded, with 44 percent of those with super covered
by public sector schemes by 1974 (NSCI 1976, p. 11). Life insurance
offices continued to play the major role in the private sector, with esti-
mates suggesting that they held more than 60 percent of private super
accounts in 1974 (NSCI 1976, p. 11). The remaining private sector em-
ployees were largely covered by small private funds overseen by trustees
(NSCI 1976, p. 9).
In the mid-1970s, concerns about the pension’s adequacy received
wide attention, including in academic reports and union campaigns for
national superannuation (a super scheme that covered the workforce
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and was administered by the state) (Olsberg 1997, p. 76). Both major
parties responded to these concerns with proposals to extend state sup-
port. Notably, in 1969, Whitlam responded by placing national super
on Labor’s policy platform (this move was also a tactic to court the
middle-class vote). Although not eventuating in reform, this put na-
tional super on the agenda and reversed decades of Labor opposition to
social insurance.
Meanwhile, union campaigns extended private super to some
workers from the mid-1970s. When confronted with a political climate
hostile to wage growth, unions pursued private super in award negoti-
ations to improve the lot of workers in lieu of wage increases (Olsberg
1997, pp. 75–76). Viewing award super – that is, super included in in-
dustrial awards – as deferred wages, unions perceived these payments
as having the benefits of supplementing the age pension and extend-
ing the super tax concessions to workers (Combet 2004, p. 17). Unions,
such as the Pulp and Paperworkers Federation (PPF) and the Federated
Storemen and Packers Union (FSPU), also sought to increase worker
control of super investments (and thereby reduce that of employers) by
introducing their own super funds (Olsberg 1997, p. 78).
The union campaign experienced some success, with award super
a key factor in expanding super coverage to 44 percent of the workforce
by 1982 (Olsberg 1997, p. 78; ABS 1982, p. 8). This increase in coverage
was not accompanied by a radical overhaul of the super industry. Public
sector schemes slightly increased their share of super accounts to 48
percent, while private sector schemes held 52 percent of accounts
(Rafter 1986, p. 241). The most significant change to the super industry
during this period involved the drop in the share of super accounts
administered by life insurance offices, which fell to around 42 percent
of private super accounts in 1983, as other financial organisations in-
creased their involvement in super (Rafter 1986, p. 241). But, the share
of super accounts remained concentrated within the life insurance in-
dustry itself; Klumpes (1992, p. 124) estimates that the then non-profit
Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) and National Mutual accounted
for about 69 percent of the life insurance industry’s superannuation
business in the late 1980s.
Award super reached new heights through its inclusion in the Ac-
cord Mark II negotiated by the Hawke Labor government and the
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) in 1986 (Olsberg 1997, p.
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76, 81). The Accord Mark II gave unions both the capacity to negotiate
award super of up to three percent of wages and a role in administering
the not-for-profit industry super funds, which were the default funds
into which award super was to be paid (for awards that covered mul-
tiple employers) (Kingston, Piggott & Bateman 1992, p. 141). Industry
super funds, an Australian innovation, have industry-wide coverage
and are mostly financed by compulsory employer contributions (Ols-
berg 1997, p. 81). Managed by a board comprising an equal number
of appointees selected by employers and unions, these not-for-profit
funds select investment strategies aimed at maximising members’ ben-
efits. In addition to increasing super coverage to 51 percent by 1988
(ABS 1988), this campaign gave Labor and the union movement a stake
in the success of private super.
In this piecemeal way, private super came to replace a national,
public superannuation scheme as Labor’s second arm of retirement in-
comes policy in the late 1980s. A series of official reports dismissed
national super as being no longer viable because of its start-up costs
(see Foster 1988, p. 190; SSCHA 1988, p. xliv). At the same time, com-
pulsory private super was presented as a solution to the long-term
pressures of population ageing on the federal budget – which had
emerged as a major social issue – because it would not increase pub-
lic expenditure. Both these views were reinforced by neoliberal ideas,
which added to perceptions that a public scheme would place undue
costs on the Budget and that financial markets allocate resources more
efficiently than the state (Quiggin 2011, p. 34). The popularity of these
ideas made national super increasingly unpalatable politically because
such a scheme would increase the government’s stake in the financial
sector (Quiggin 2011, p. 34; Sharp 2009, p. 202).
Formally adopting private super in 1989, Labor argued that it
would improve the adequacy of retirement incomes and help to in-
crease national savings (Howe 1989, p. 4). After unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to increase award super through later Accords, Labor directly ex-
tended private super to the workforce by legislating the Superannuation
Guarantee Scheme in 1991 (Mann 1993). This scheme requires employ-
ers to contribute super contributions on their employees’ behalf; the
rate of compulsory employer contributions gradually increased from
three to nine percent of wages between 1992 and 2002 (Kerin 1991).
In 1994, the Keating government announced that it would defer pre-
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viously promised tax cuts as a further increase to the Super Guarantee
after 2002. But, the Howard government chose to not implement this
increase in 1997 (Nielson & Harris 2009). In 2012, the Rudd and Gillard
governments announced that the Super Guarantee would be gradually
increased to 12 percent of wages between 2013 and 2019 (Australian
Government 2012, p. 9).2 However, in 2014, the Abbott Coalition gov-
ernment delayed the increase in the Super Guarantee, so that it would
not reach 12 per cent until 2025 (Martin & Hutchens 2014). The Super
Guarantee represents one of the most significant shifts of provision to
the private sector; between 1990 and 2012, this scheme contributed to
coverage expanding from 64 to 90 percent of the workforce and to su-
per investments ballooning from $123 billion to $1.4 trillion (Nielson
& Harris 2009; APRA 2013).
The extension of private super to the workforce also extended the
super tax concessions from $5.6 billion of revenue forgone in 1984 to
$32.1 billion in 2013–14 (Treasury 2014, p. 12). Despite their growing
significance, the super tax concessions were subject to minor reforms
between 1915 and the election of the Hawke government. In 1983, the
first reform package reduced the budgetary cost of the super tax con-
cessions by limiting access to superannuation benefits to those aged
55 years or over and increasing the taxes levied on lump-sum super
benefits.3 The government set the tax rates at 15 percent for the first
$50,000 of lump-sum super benefits and at 30 percent for any bene-
fits above this amount (Keating 1983). This reduced the inequality of
the super tax concessions by increasing the tax paid on larger super
benefits. In 1984, a second reform removed the 30/20 rule that, since
1961, had required super funds to invest 30 percent of their portfolios
in government bonds to receive tax discounts (Wallis 1997, p. 572). As a
response to recommendations of the Campbell Committee and Martin
Report, this reform was one of a suite of measures that deregulated the
2 Initial increases to the Superannuation Guarantee were legislated by the Gillard
government before Labor lost office in September 2013. In Opposition, the Liberal
party committed to raising the Super Guarantee to 12 percent of wages, but
indicated that it would delay implementation.
3 Until 1983, lump-sum super benefits were taxed at the highly concessional rate
of five percent and there was no minimum age at which super benefits could be
drawn.
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financial sector (Sharp 2009, p. 201).4 These reforms aimed to minimise
state interference in the financial sector because investors operating in
competitive markets were perceived to make more efficient decisions
that would maximise return (Sharp 2009, p. 201). In 1988, the third
set of reforms brought forward revenue by establishing 15 percent tax
concessions on employer super contributions, super fund earnings and
benefits (Daniels 2011, p. 36). The government argued that this reform
was revenue neutral because tax increases at earlier stages of the super
income stream (on contributions and investments) would be offset by
reducing the tax on super benefits.
Initially, the Howard government reduced the inequality of the su-
per tax concessions and expanded the options workers had available to
them in regards to choice of fund. In 1996, the government reduced in-
equality by introducing the Superannuation Surcharge, which required
those earning more than $75,000 per year to pay an additional 15 per-
cent tax on super contributions (Treasury 2001, p. 87). The government
also supported low-income groups by establishing an 18 percent re-
bate for private super invested on behalf of low-income spouses and the
Superannuation Co-contribution Scheme, which matched voluntary
private super contributions made by low-income earners dollar-for-
dollar up to $1,000 per year (Warren 2008, p. 18). And, in 2002, the
Howard government was able to introduce legislation for Super Choice
(first announced in 1997), which gave workers the ability to choose be-
tween five funds nominated by their employers rather than the fund
nominated in their industrial agreement (Warren 2008, p. 18). Super
Choice made super more like a consumer product, giving individuals
greater scope to select a fund and assume responsibility for their in-
vestments. This reform aimed to marketise super by increasing both
competition between funds for customers and the lucrative opportuni-
ties available to private providers.
However, toward the end of its term, the government changed its
focus by introducing reforms that increased the benefits received by a
core constituency of wealthy voters. Arguing that it was reducing com-
plexity, the government decreased the Super Surcharge to 7.5 percent
4 The Hawke government set up the Martin Committee in 1983 to assess the
Campbell Report. The Campbell Committee, which was tabled in 1981,
recommended sweeping financial de-regulation (Sharp 2009, p. 201).
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in 2004 and then abolished it in 2005 (Warren 2008, p. 19). Then, in
2006, the government announced the Simplified Super package, which
made super benefits exempt from tax and halved the taper rate for the
age pension (Warren 2008, pp. 21–23). These reforms simplified the
taxation of super but increased inequality by reducing the tax paid by
those who had large super investments, which assisted a core Coalition
constituency of older and wealthy voters – including those nearing re-
tirement (Fraser 2006, p. 7).
Both the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments reformed these
concessions. In 2010, the Rudd government announced that those on
annual incomes of less than $37,000 would receive a 15 percent tax re-
bate on their super contributions from July 2012. Previously, this group
of lower income earners had received no tax discount, as the 15 percent
concessional tax rate was equal to their marginal tax rate. In 2012, the
Gillard government halved the tax discount on super contributions re-
ceived by the top 1.2 percent of income earners who receive incomes
of more than $300,000 to 15 percent from July 2012 (Australian Gov-
ernment 2012, p. 35). These reforms have not radically reduced the
incidence or scale of those concessions. Overall, the rapid expansion of
the super tax concessions in the last few decades is clearly the result of
the policy shift to private retirement incomes that has extended com-
pulsory private super to the workforce.5
The ‘financialisation’ of private superannuation
The two decades following the establishment of compulsory super have
coincided with structural change to the private super industry. Similar
to the United States and the United Kingdom, the Australian superan-
nuation industry has been transformed by financialisation. Financiali-
sation refers to the increasing role of financial actors, motives, markets
and institutions in organising the economy (Epstein, cited in Martin,
Rafferty & Bryan 2008, p. 122). Cutler and Waine (2001, pp. 99–100)
5 Revenue forgone in super tax concessions accounts for less now than before the
Global Financial Crisis. As recently as 2008, the super tax concessions were
estimated at $38.9 billion of revenue forgone (Treasury 2013, p. 4). However they
fell to $24.1 billion in 2009–10 reflecting the lower returns that super funds have
received on their investments (Treasury 2013, p. 4).
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usefully distinguish between three features of financialisation: first, it
involves the elevation of financial criteria to assess fund performance
(and the marginalisation of other criteria); second, super funds are
operated to maximise ‘shareholder value’, rather than value for stake-
holders such as account holders; and, third, regulatory frameworks are
deregulated to advance the pursuit of profit (Cutler & Waine 2001, p.
100). These features of financialisation are evident in the deregulation
of the financial sector, as well as changes to both the composition of
the Australian super industry and structure of benefits offered to fund
members over recent decades.
The regulatory framework that private super funds operate in was
altered by broad-sweeping deregulation to financial markets in the
1980s and 1990s. These reforms aimed to increase the efficiency (and
thus profit) of financial markets by opening up the financial sector to
competition, reducing the barriers to market entry, and discouraging
market segmentation (Keneley 2001, p. 163). The abolition of the 30/20
rule was of particular significance for the super industry because it gave
funds the freedom to pursue more profitable ventures than bonds. On a
broad level, these reforms resulted in a regulatory framework that gave
private super funds, not-for-profit and for-profit alike, greater scope to
pursue profits.
Financial deregulation has encouraged life insurance funds to
transform their structure and role in the private super industry (Kene-
ley 2001, p. 164). An important development has been that several
large life insurance funds – including major players in the private super
industry such as National Mutual in 1995 and AMP in 1997 – have
responded to deregulation by demutualising their operations (Keneley
2001, p. 164). Demutualisation has financialised the super industry by
converting not-for-profit funds into for-profit entities. This replaced an
associational logic of risk-sharing among members, dating back to the
19th century in some cases, with a market logic of profit maximisation.
It also transformed fund members of NFPs into consumers and share-
holders. With key providers now operating on a for-profit basis, the
distinction between not-for-profit life insurance funds and other forms
of for-profit private super can no longer be sustained. A further sig-
nificant development was that not-for-profit life insurance funds were
under pressure to act as if they were for-profit because they had to
compete with banks for capital to expand their business and they ex-
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perienced increased competition from industry super funds (Keneley
2001, p. 162). Another major development has been deregulation of
(some) restrictions on mergers and acquisitions that has enabled the
formation of conglomerates that specialise in multiple financial services
(Keneley 2001, p. 163). These financial conglomerates have blurred
the distinction between the life insurance industry and other parts of
the finance sector (Keneley 2001, p. 164). These three processes have
significantly contracted the traditional role of life insurance funds as
not-for-profit providers and expanded their involvement in for-profit
provision.
The restructuring of the life insurance sector reflects a wider shift
in the composition of the private super industry. The Australian Pru-
dential Regulatory Authority (APRA) classifies super funds into five
categories: public sector funds; the non-profit industry funds; retail
funds privately operated on a commercial basis; corporate funds run
by employers for their own employees; and, small (or self-managed)
funds with fewer than five members (2013, p. 10). Table 3.1 displays
how the overall share of super accounts and assets held by each type
of fund changed between 1996 and 2011. The table shows that industry
super funds increased their share of super accounts from 33 to 37 per-
cent, while their share of super assets has increased from eight to 19
percent. As the proportion of assets held by these funds is much lower
than their share of super accounts, it suggests that those with lower su-
per balances benefit most from the industry funds. It also reveals that
the accounts managed by retail super funds have markedly grown from
39 to 48 percent, whereas their assets increased from 24 to 28 percent
of the total. And, the table shows that small funds have marginally in-
creased their share of accounts from one to three percent, but had the
greatest growth in assets from 12 percent to 32 percent of those held
by the super industry. This suggests that small funds are predominately
held by the very wealthy. In contrast, corporate and public sector funds
decreased their share of both super accounts and assets; public sec-
tor funds now account for about 11 percent of super accounts and 14
percent of assets. Although somewhat offset by the growth of not-for-
profit industry funds, these figures indicate that for-profit funds (that
maximise shareholder value), and self-managed funds favoured by the
well-off, have increased their market share since the establishment of
the Super Guarantee.
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Table 3.1: Proportion of super accounts and super assets held by the main types of
funds, 1996 and 2011
Super accounts Super assets
1996 2011 1996 2011
’000s % ’000s % $b % $b %
Corporate 1,300 8 593 3 45.6 19 56.6 5
Industry 5,200 33 11,449 37 20.2 8 226.2 19
Public sector 3,000 19 3,373 11 48.1 20 172.9 14
Retail 6,100 39 15,063 48 59.6 24 339.5 28
Small 200 1 846 3 28.2 12 392.9 32
Total* 15,800 100 31,324 100 202.0 100 1,299.0 100
Source: APRA (2007, 2012) * Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding
While the Super Guarantee does not require compulsory super
contributions to be invested in accounts with particular benefit struc-
tures, it has nevertheless coincided with a dramatic shift in the structure
of the super accounts offered by private super funds from defined bene-
fit schemes to accumulation accounts. Defined benefit schemes provide
private pensions that are calculated according to both a member’s fi-
nal salary and the duration of their contributions (APRA 2007, p. 5).
In contrast, accumulation accounts manage super in individual savings
accounts, providing benefits in relation to the contributions made and
interest earned (or loss) from investment (APRA 2007, p. 5). Whereas
82 percent of super accounts had a defined benefit structure in 1982,
less than 14 percent of super accounts had this structure by 2000 (Trea-
sury 2001, p. 85). In 2000, accumulation accounts comprised 86 percent
of super accounts.
The shift toward accumulation accounts has continued in the last
decade. Table 3.2 provides data on the benefit structures of super ac-
counts held by Australians in 2010. In addition to the two types of
schemes already discussed, the table includes data on hybrid accounts
that combine features of accumulation accounts and defined benefit
schemes. The table displays the number of super accounts held with
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Table 3.2: Benefit structures of superannuation accounts in Australia, 2010
Accounts AssetsBenefit structure
’000s % $ billion %
Accumulation account 19,589 60 750.4 63
Defined benefit 645 2 57.9 5
Hybrid account 12,624 38 379.8 32
Total 32,857 100 1,188.1 100
Source: APRA (2011, p. 21)
each benefit structure (like Table 3.1), but does not reveal the portion of
Australians with each type of account (as multiple accounts may be held
by an individual). Nonetheless, accumulation accounts have spread fur-
ther, with the table showing that about two percent of super accounts
have only a defined benefit structure. Of these defined benefit schemes,
98 percent of accounts are held in public sector funds and have since
been replaced with accumulation accounts (APRA 2011, p. 37). Be-
cause of this, the number of accounts in the defined benefit category
is expected to drop further. Table 3.2 also shows that accumulation
accounts hold 63 percent of super assets and hybrid accounts hold a
further 32 percent. Taken together, this data confirm that accumulation
accounts have become the main form of private super since the advent
of award super and the Super Guarantee.
The shift to accumulation accounts reflects broader international
trends in other private pension markets, especially those in other
English-speaking countries (see Langley 2004; Cutler & Waine 2001).
This shift is associated with the financialisation of the private super
industry because the risk profile of accumulation accounts is more con-
ducive to maximising shareholder return than defined benefit schemes
(Cutler & Waine 2001, p. 108). In defined benefit schemes, the in-
vestment risk is borne by the fund and the employer-sponsor, who
guarantee account holders a set benefit level at retirement (Davis &
Hughes 1992, p. 167). Accumulation accounts, in contrast, leave the
account holder responsible for the investment risk, with employers
guaranteeing only a set level of contributions and the funds not specify-
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ing the level of benefit (if any) that will be received at retirement (Davis
& Hughes 1992, p. 168). The shift of investment risk to account holders
with accumulation accounts has been appealing to private super funds
that aim to maximise shareholder value because they limit the funds’
exposure to shortfalls and provide greater certainty of their liabilities by
passing losses onto account holders (Cutler & Waine 2001, p. 108).
Financialisation has also coincided with the growth of accumula-
tion accounts through its impact on industry super funds. The growing
role of industry super funds has accelerated the uptake of accumu-
lation accounts, with only three of 100 such funds offering defined
benefit schemes in 1992 (Kingston, Piggott & Bateman 1992, p. 141).
Kingston and associates (1992, p. 141) contend that industry funds
seem to have offered accumulation accounts because of issues in se-
curing sponsors that would be legally responsible to guarantee defined
benefits (if funds went into deficit) when multiple employers are in-
volved. APRA (2007, p. 5) further argue that this reflected a broader
shift in employer preferences for accumulation accounts since they
found the high cost of defined benefit schemes and their potential to
increase their liabilities unappealing. The provision of accumulation
accounts by industry funds reflects financialisation to the extent that
employers sought to limit their liability (and maximise profits) and that
the state chose not to regulate sponsoring arrangements. In turn, Davis
and Hughes (1992, p. 168) claim that the prevalence of accumulation
accounts has led industry funds to manage their investments to max-
imise short-term profit (like retail funds) since their members follow
annual performances more closely than those with defined benefits.
The overall implication here is that the industry funds are managed
in similar ways and offer similar benefits to ‘financialised’ private su-
per funds despite their not-for-profit status. In fact, Bryan, Ham and
Rafferty (2008, p. 44) found that not-for-profit funds – including the
industry super funds – outperformed private retail funds between 2004
and 2008. As will be seen in the ensuing discussion, both the financial-
isation of the private super industry and the rise of accumulation funds
have implications for the efficiency and equity of private retirement in-
comes policy.
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Value for money? Interactions between private super and
retirement incomes policy
What to make of this recent shift to private provision? Has privatisation
and financialisation made retirement incomes policy more efficient? A
useful starting point for assessing the shift to private super is to exam-
ine how efficiently it has met the official rationales that governments
have offered for recent reforms. As the policy history above shows, the
Super Guarantee has been linked to three major policy goals: boosting
retirement incomes; advancing national savings; and reducing the fis-
cal pressure of population ageing on future governments. On a more
general level, Labor and the ACTU came to prefer private super over
a public scheme because, as in other cases of privatisation, of percep-
tions that the private sector would more efficiently allocate funds and
that expanding the public sector would cost too much. Support for a
private scheme from Treasury, the Cass Social Security Review and the
financial sector reinforced these perceptions (Sharp 2009; Mann 1993).
At first glance, the superannuation guarantee appears to have met these
goals with flying colours. Private super offers almost all workers a sec-
ondary source of retirement income and seems to have contributed
$1.4 trillion to national savings and reduced future fiscal pressures –
all without seeming to expand public spending. However, a closer look
at the interactions between private super and other second-tier policies
casts doubt on the efficiency of current retirement income policy.
Boosting retirement incomes?
The superannuation guarantee’s contribution to increasing retirement
incomes might seem to be its most self-evident achievement. The
scheme has expanded super coverage and investments to new heights.
But, it is one thing for private super to have increased retirement in-
comes and quite another for it to have done so efficiently. For the Super
Guarantee to boost retirement incomes efficiently, retirees would, at
the very least, have to use their super investments as income. Both the
structure of super benefits and available evidence on how super is spent
by retirees suggest that this link is more tenuous than generally as-
sumed.
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Superannuation is available to those aged 55 years or older who
retire and to those who continue to work past the age of 65 years. Nev-
ertheless, the structure of super benefits is a key factor in whether funds
are used as retirement income. Defined benefit schemes, as well as the
defined benefit component of hybrid schemes, are most likely to be
used as retirement income because they are receivable only as a private
pension that provides a regular income to beneficiaries once they reach
a certain age. Benefits from accumulation accounts or components can
be used as retirement income or potentially put to other uses as they are
mostly received as lump-sum payments. As Disney points out, super
benefits from accumulation accounts can ‘be expended at the onset of
retirement, or passed on to relatives for tax avoidance purposes, rather
than used as retirement income’ (2007, p. 3). The potential for super
benefits to be put to other uses is exacerbated by the tax exemption of
super benefits received after age 60 years – five years before retirees are
eligible for the age pension, provided they meet its eligibility criteria.
Because of the prevalence of accumulation accounts and the relatively
low level of super held by most current retirees, there is no guarantee
that private super is drawn on as retirement income (even though peo-
ple receive it at retirement age).
In fact, the available evidence suggests that lump-sum private super
tends to be used to pay off household debt rather than used as retire-
ment income. Kelly and associates (2004) compare household debt and
the super held at retirement with the amounts of each held in the years
leading up to it. They note that in households with at least one per-
son aged 50–69 years in the workforce, the average super balance was
$170,000 and mean household debt was $85,500 in 2002 (Kelly, Far-
botko & Harding 2004, p. 8). For households where people aged 50–69
years had retired, the average super balance was $93,000 and household
debt was $22,700 in 2002 (Kelly et al. 2004, p. 8). Because of these dif-
ferent levels of debt and higher home ownership among retired people,
Kelly and colleagues (2004) argue that super appears to be used to pay
off debt accrued when in the labour force. This is consistent with more
recent data that show 69 percent of individual retirees who received
lump-sum super between 2003 and 2007 did not use their benefits pri-
marily for retirement income (ABS 2011, p. 92). These ‘other’ uses of
private super undermine the compulsory nature of super to the extent
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that individuals use their benefits to bring forward consumption and
accrue debt before retirement.
Retirees’ use of lump-sum super to pay off mortgages or reduce
debt from housing upgrades is unsurprising, considering the incentives
for investing in owner-occupier housing. The favourable tax treatment
of owner-occupier provides incentives to individuals from all age
groups to invest in housing over other investments. Owner-occupier
housing is exempt from capital gains tax and imputed rent is not taxed
(Smith 2004, p. 194; Yates 2010, p. 32). Retirees have a further incentive
to invest in their primary residence, since owner-occupier housing has
long been excluded from the assets test of the age pension (as noted
above). Taken together, these policies offer retirees incentives to invest
their super in owner-occupier housing (potentially to over–invest) and
to claim the age pension as their retirement income (also see Spies-
Butcher & Stebbing 2011).
Although spending lump-sum super on housing or servicing debt
may increase household wealth, it does not, in itself, boost retirement
income. It could be argued that this does not prevent private super
spent from contributing to retirement income through reverse equity
mortgages, which allow retirees to access income or lump-sum from
housing assets that they own. However, this industry is in its infancy in
Australia, with only 1.4 percent of individuals aged more than 60 years
holding a reverse mortgage in 2007 (Henry 2008, p. 28). The evidence
thus casts doubt on the significance of the direct, or indirect, contribu-
tion made by lump-sum super benefits from accumulation accounts to
retirement income.
Reducing the pressures of population ageing?
The capacity of private retirement incomes policy to offset the public
costs of the age pension over the long term as the population ages
also seems straightforward. The Super Guarantee and other second-tier
policies relating to private super are widely assumed to reduce bud-
getary costs by directing funds into private super that will then be used
as retirement income instead of the age pension. As the assumption that
private super provides retirement income has already been shown to be
suspect, the focus here is on the projected impact of the super tax con-
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cessions on the efficiency of private retirement incomes policy as the
population ages.
Like other affluent societies, Australia’s population is projected to
age in coming decades because of declining fertility and rising life ex-
pectancy. Fertility rates have fallen from 3.5 to two births per woman
between 1961 and 2008 (Treasury 2010, p. 7). Average life expectancy
has also risen by (at least) 24 years for men and women since 1901,
reaching 79.2 years for men and 83.7 years for women in 2006–7 (Trea-
sury 2010, p. 6). Table 3.3 displays projections from the third Intergen-
erational report on the impact that these trends are expected to have
on the age structure of Australia’s population. These official projections
show that the proportion of the population aged over 65 years is ex-
pected to grow from 13.5 to 22.7 percent between 2010 and 2050 –
projected growth of almost 70 percent. Population ageing will increase
outlays on the age pension, but care has to be taken to avoid overstat-
ing by how much for two reasons. First, these projections are likely to
over-estimate the scale of the problem because they are based on con-
servative assumptions and are sensitive to small changes due to their
long-term nature (Dowrick & McDonald 2002, pp. 9–10).6 Evidence of
this is that the third Intergenerational report has scaled down the pro-
jected costs of population ageing found in the first two reports (released
in 2001 and 2007). Second, Australia has a ‘favourable demographic
profile’ compared to many similar countries (OECD 2009, p. 150). Both
these considerations suggest that the budgetary impact of population
ageing will be modest in Australia.
However, in the event that population ageing were to considerably
add to fiscal pressures, the evidence suggests that the current policy
settings for private super are not particularly efficient. This is because
private super has limited capacity to act as a substitute for the age pen-
sion and thereby reduce public spending. The Intergenerational report
6 Dowrick and McDonald (2002, p. 10) argue that the projections in the
Intergenerational report are pessimistic because they underestimate the potential
for: the participation rate to increase; low unemployment to stimulate the
economy; and, healthier lifestyle choices to counterbalance the cost of health and
aged care. Moreover, they argue that the report does not give due attention to the
projected growth of real after tax incomes because of its focus on the state of
public finances (Dowrick & McDonald 2002, pp. 10–11).
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Table 3.3: Age structure of the Australian population, 1970–2050
1970 (% of
population)
2010 (% of
population)
2050 (Projected %
of population)
0–14 years 28.8 19.1 17.2
15–64 years 62.8 67.4 60.2
65–84 years 7.8 11.7 17.6
85+ years 0.5 1.8 5.1
Source: Treasury intergenerational report (2010, p. 10)
projects that the pension’s cost will rise from 2.7 to 3.9 percent of GDP
in 2049–50 (Treasury 2010, p. 47). But the Treasury estimates that pri-
vate super will only reduce public spending on the age pension by six
percent in 2050 when the Super Guarantee matures (Harmer 2009). Ex-
trapolating from this, private super is subsidised by $30 billion of super
tax concessions, which amounts to 2.1 percent of GDP, and is projected
to reduce spending on the age pension by less than 0.2 percent of GDP
in 2050.7 As super is projected to save less than 10 percent of what the
super tax concessions currently cost as a proportion of GDP, it is dif-
ficult to avoid the conclusion that private super provides an expensive
and inefficient means to combat any fiscal pressures associated with
population ageing.
The high cost and inefficiency of the super tax concessions often es-
capes attention because their tax expenditure design has afforded them
a low profile. These concessions are still excluded from official reports
such as the Budget and Intergenerational reports. The omission from the
latter is particularly concerning, since these reports represent official
projections of population ageing and the super tax concessions are one
of the more expensive social policies associated with this demographic
trend, currently costing just less than the age pension itself. This omis-
7 This figure is calculated as six percent of 3.9 percent of GDP. The latter figure is
what the age pension is projected to cost in 2050. Moreover, in 2010, the super tax
concessions were lower than they previously had been because super funds made
few returns in volatile global markets. This suggests that the potential saving is
likely to be even less when global financial conditions improve.
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sion considerably reduces the usefulness of the Intergenerational reports
and makes private super seem to appear more efficient and cost-effec-
tive than it is. Despite these data limitations, it is clear that the high
cost of the super tax concessions is a major source of inefficiency that
thwarts the long-term sustainability of current policies for private su-
per.
Increasing national savings?
At first glance, the trillion dollars invested in private super appears to
have made progress on the economic goal of boosting national sav-
ings. Both Labor and Coalition governments have promoted national
savings because of concerns that dwindling local savings would leave
the economy reliant on global financial markets for investment funds
and exposed to shocks (such as the Global Financial Crisis of 2008).
This, in turn, would lead to lower economic growth and employment
(FitzGerald 1993, p. 5). As private super is preserved until retirement,
governments have argued private retirement incomes policy promotes
national savings by channelling funds into more productive capital in-
vestments than housing (Edey & Gower 2000, pp. 277, 288).
The link between super and national savings has, however, proven
difficult to establish in practice, because it is difficult to calculate the
extent to which compulsory super contributions replace other forms
of household savings that would have been made in their absence
(FitzGerald et al. 2007, p. 6). Projections calculated by researchers com-
plicate this further, with estimates of compulsory super’s contribution
to new household saving ranging from 37 to 75 percent (Edey & Gower
2000, p. 297). A further reason for this difficulty is that record house-
hold debt has offset increases to national saving from private super
(FitzGerald et al. 2007, p. iii). On the one hand, households have limited
savings capacity because they are, on average, servicing high mortgage
and credit card debt. On the other hand, the potential of private super
to increase national savings is undermined by retirees’ use of lump-sum
super benefits to service household debts.
But, more fundamentally, Coates (2004) contends that national
saving is an abstract concept with increasingly limited practical use.
National saving has become difficult to separate from foreign savings
because of the global integration of finance and capital markets (Coates
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2004, p. 83). This means that a national savings pool cannot be pre-
sumed and its definition and size are arbitrary to some extent (Coates
2004, p. 90). For example, it is difficult to calculate how much owner-
occupied housing contributes to national savings because its roles as a
vehicle of household savings and source of household debt are not eas-
ily separated (Coates 2004, p. 91). At the same time, housing values are
inflated by tax and pension asset test exemptions. Just as importantly,
Coates (2004, p. 93) argues that economic globalisation challenges the
concept of national saving by implicating household assets and mort-
gages, as well as private super funds and their portfolios, in interna-
tional processes. Since the national element of these savings cannot
always be easily separated, Coates claims that private super provides
‘savings for investment … not national savings for domestic investment’
(2004, p. 97). This is borne out by recent evidence, which suggests that
only 39 percent of super assets actually are held in Australia, with 29
percent of these assets held in Australian shares and 10 percent in Aus-
tralian fixed interest accounts (APRA 2011, p. 40).
In sum, the economic benefits of private super are more often as-
serted than defended by evidence. The analysis presented here casts
doubt on the efficiency of private retirement incomes policy as a means
of boosting retirement income, offsetting future fiscal pressures from
population ageing and increasing national savings. It also reveals that
the super tax concessions undermine the efficiency of private super be-
cause of their immense budgetary cost.
The hidden inequalities of private super: Shining light on
regressive super tax concessions
As retirement incomes policy is a major area of social provision, the
distributive effects of the shift to private super are not incidental. The
capacity of social provision to address inequalities is important because
material differences impact on the distribution of individual opportu-
nities and societal wellbeing (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). In contrast to
the redistributive impact of the first tier of retirement incomes policy,
recent reform to private retirement incomes policy has reinforced in-
equality by individualising risk and expanding the cost of the inequi-
table super tax concessions.
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Reinforcing inequality by individualising risk
The Super Guarantee has reinforced labour market inequalities be-
tween high- and low-income earners, especially as it has coincided
with the financialisation of the private super industry. The spread of
accumulation accounts, which has been promoted through financiali-
sation, has served to individualise the social risk of income insecurity
in retirement (Cutler & Waine 2001). This risk shift is particularly obvi-
ous when accumulation accounts are contrasted with their alternatives.
Accumulation accounts involve neither the redistributive mechanisms
of state-administered social insurance schemes, nor the commitments
from employers and financial markets to guarantee a certain benefit in
retirement typical of defined benefit schemes. The spread of accumula-
tion accounts has thus shifted risk onto individuals and away from the
state, employers and financial institutions (see Cutler & Waine 2001;
Langley 2004). Accordingly, the benefits retirees can draw from their
super in accumulation accounts are vulnerable to downturns in unpre-
dictable global financial markets – such as the Global Financial Crisis
and its unfolding aftermath – but the financial institutions that manage
private super funds and the state are largely insulated from liability.
Although retirees with defined benefit schemes tend to receive
more benefits and experience less risk than other retirees, the inequali-
ties between those who hold accumulation accounts are the focus here
because the latter are the predominant form of private super and most
defined benefit schemes have been closed to new members. Accumu-
lation schemes provide individuals with benefits in relation to the rate
and length of individual contributions, as well as the earnings from
their investments. The advent of compulsory superannuation at a time
when accumulation accounts became the norm has provided high-in-
come earners with a cumulative advantage since their contributions are
larger and they have the potential to earn more interest than low-in-
come earners. The upshot of this is that second-tier retirement incomes
policy mainly benefits those employed full time, while offering little to
low-income earners, casual and part-time workers, or those who have
extended absences from paid employment (such as the long-term un-
employed and full-time carers). Indeed, low-income earners are likely
to be adversely affected by the requirement that they defer nine percent
of their income via super that could be put to other uses. This has
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particular implications for gender inequality because gender pay gaps
persist; women perform most casual and part-time work; and, they still
undertake the bulk of care work (see Sharp & Austen 2006; also see
Spies-Butcher & Stebbing 2011, p. 53).
The next two tables confirm that private super reinforces these in-
equalities. Again, these tables show the percentage of super accounts
(again, individuals may hold multiple accounts). Table 3.4 compares
super benefits with the gender, gross weekly income and labour force
status of those who held them in 2007. The table shows that women
tend to hold less private super than men, lower income earners tend
to hold less than higher income earners, and unemployed people hold
less than those in paid employment. Table 3.5 compares the median and
mean of the super benefits held by the gender, gross weekly income and
labour force status of account holders. The mean shows how much su-
per each account would hold if super assets were evenly spread, while
the median is the mid-point for each grouping if super assets were
ranked by how much super they hold. For example, half of the ac-
counts held by women have $18,489 or less, but these accounts would
each hold $52,272 if super was spread evenly. Table 3.5 also reveals
that median super benefits for each gender, income and labour force
grouping is proportionately much lower than the respective mean (or
average) – thus the top half of the super accounts in each category
hold much more than the bottom half. Although not conclusive, this
provides further evidence suggesting that super assets are concentrated
among employed men with the highest incomes.
Hidden and inequitable: the super tax concessions
The super tax concessions are, however, the major source of inequality
in second-tier retirement incomes. Although the evidence supports this
conclusion, the hidden nature of these concessions makes it difficult
to ascertain their distributive effects. These policies remain hidden be-
cause of limits to existing sources of information about them and their
low profile. The Tax Expenditures Statement, which remains the most
reliable source on the super tax concessions, provides only aggregate
estimates. Long-term projections, such as the aforementioned Intergen-
erational reports, do not estimate the revenue forgone from super tax
concessions. And, existing research tends to be hypothetical, often us-
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Table 3.4: Super benefits by gender, gross income, and labour force status in 2007,
percent
Current account balance/withdrawal benefit
$1–$9,999 $10,000–
$24,999
$25,000–
$49,999
$50,000–
$99,999
$100,000+ Total
Gender
Male 46 44 53 58 66 52
Female 54 56 47 42 34 48
Gross
income**
$1–$299 23 12 8 6 8 13
$300–$599 28 19 13 8 7 17
$600–$999 27 36 34 26 16 27
$1,000–$1,499 6 16 23 29 25 17
$1,500–$1,999 2 3 6 11 15 6
$2,000+ 1 2 4 10 18 6
Labour
force***
Employed 79 89 90 92 87 86
Unemployed 5 2 2 1* 1 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
* High standard error of estimate. ** Gross weekly individual income; column to-
tals do not add to 100 as data for nil, negative and unknown income have been
excluded. *** Those not in labour force excluded from analysis as it is difficult to
calculate this data due to the inclusion of retirees. Source: ABS (2011, p. 81)
ing estimates based on the policy design of the super tax concessions
rather than actual data (for example, see Denniss 2007 and Ingles 2009).
Moreover, it is difficult to estimate the distributive effects of these poli-
cies because the Super Guarantee will not mature for at least three
decades. Before this time, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which
salary-sacrificing provisions have been used, how these tax concessions
impact on final super balances and financial market returns over the
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Table 3.5: Comparison of mean and median superannuation balances, 2007
Median ($) Mean ($) Median as a pro-
portion of Mean
(%)
Sex
Male 31,252 87,589 36
Female 18,489 52,272 35
Gross income*
$1–$299 6,719 41,498 16
$300–$599 8,787 33,246 26
$600–$999 20,000 44,672 45
$1,000–$1,499 47,591 89,884 53
$1,500–$1,999 70,851 135,375 52
$2,000+ 108,558 220,774 49
Labour force
Employed 25,084 69,193 36
Unemployed 3,500 30,556 11
Total 23,698 70,670 33
* Gross weekly individual income; data for nil, negative and unknown income ex-
cluded. Source: ABS (2011, pp. 82–83)
longer term. Nevertheless, given that the concessions reduce tax rev-
enue by around $30 billion, it is surprising that so little is known about
their distributive implications.
The super tax concessions may appear to treat taxpayers equally,
but the flat tax rates they levy on super deliver inequitable benefits be-
cause of how they interact with the progressive income tax scales. As
Table 3.6 shows, these tax concessions provide inequitable benefits at
each stage of the super income stream. The tax discount received on
super contributions depends on the amount of income earned. Super
contributions made by those who earn incomes less than $37,000 per
year are subject to a 15 percent tax rebate. The 15 percent concessional
tax rate that applies to contributions made by those who earn above
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$37,000 but less than $300,000 delivers a tax discount between 15 and
30 percent. And, the 30 percent tax concession for contributions made
by those who earn over $300,000 provides a tax discount of 15 percent.
Annual limits currently apply to the amount of super contributions that
can be taxed at these concessional rates; for those under 50 years, the
annual limit is $25,000, while it is $50,000 for those aged 50 years and
above (ATO 2012). The flat rate 15 percent concessional tax rates on
super earnings offers no benefit to income earners with incomes below
$37,000, but delivers a 30 percent tax discount on investment returns
for those earning $180,000 or more each year (up to annual limits).
The tax exemption of super benefits is more inequitable, providing the
biggest tax discounts to those receiving the largest super benefits (see
Table 3.6).
Clearly, these tax concessions grant the largest reductions to those
who have income and/or super assets that are sufficient for them to
pay the highest marginal tax rates. Moreover, higher income earners
are more likely to be able to take advantage of the salary-sacrificing
provisions and benefit further from these concessions. Compared to
both the equitable age pension and the Super Guarantee that merely re-
inforces labour market inequalities, the super tax concessions actively
extend them. Extrapolating from the above, the evidence suggests that
employed men with the highest incomes benefit most from these con-
cessions.
In claiming that second-tier retirement incomes policy is inequi-
table, I am not arguing that the Australian retirement incomes system
is more inequitable overall than those in other countries. This is not
only beyond the scope of this chapter, but is unclear because the Super
Guarantee has not matured. Rather, my intention is to display how the
privatisation of retirement incomes policy has entrenched, and even
extended, inequality. It is clear that the super tax concessions are dif-
ficult to justify in light of their $30 billion cost and inequity. It also
follows from the earlier policy history that the tax concessions that cur-
rently subsidise the operations of for-profit super funds were intended
to support the not-for-profit sector and that their current scale was in-
conceivable at their introduction.
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Table 3.6: Tax benefits provided by the super tax concessions in 2012–13, percent
Income range
($)
Margi-
nal tax
rate (%)
Tax paid on
super contri-
butions (%)
Tax dis-
count on
super contri-
butions (%)
Tax dis-
count
from 15
percent
flat rate
tax on
fund
earnings
(%)
Tax dis-
count
from ex-
emption
on super
benefits
(%)
0–18,000 Nil 0 0 0 0
18,001–37,000 15 0 15 0 15
37,001–80,000 30 15 15 15 30
80,001–180,000 37 15 18 17 38
180,000–300,000 45 15 30 30 45
300,001+ 45 30 15 30 45
The challenge for reform: A case of politics before policy?
The analysis presented in this chapter calls into question the benefits of
privatisation of retirement incomes. Evidence suggests that the recent
shift onto second-tier retirement incomes policy, which culminated in
the Super Guarantee, has increased inequality – and gender inequal-
ity in particular – without efficiently meetings its policy goals. This is
not to argue that the Super Guarantee should be abolished, or that pri-
vate super is not an important source of secondary household savings.
Rather, it is to highlight the need for further reform. Importantly, the
ability of private super to increase retirement income, reduce public
spending and boost national savings are much more tenuous than of-
ten assumed. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to justify the large
and inequitable subsidies that the super tax concessions provide to
private super funds and the well-off. The clear implications of these
findings are that reform to the super tax concessions and Super Guar-
antee could simultaneously improve efficiency and reduce inequality.
So, what prospects are there for reform?
Reform to the super tax concessions is a top priority because they
are costly policies that deliver most benefit to those who need it least.
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However, the major political parties do not currently prioritise reform
to these tax concessions. Admittedly, this is less of an issue for the
Coalition parties, which extended the benefits these concessions
granted to key well-off constituencies at the end of their last term in
office. The Rudd and Gillard governments introduced limited reforms
that have reduced the inequality of the concessions. Remarkably, even
their minor reforms have had an impact because of the immense scale
of these concessions; the Gillard government’s decision to halve the tax
discount on super contributions received by those earning more than
$300,000 per year was projected to raise revenue by around $1 billion
over the 2012–13 Budget’s forward estimates (Australian Government
2012, p. 41). Labor may have been expected to propose more ambi-
tious reform, considering that during their period in office, the super
tax concessions were the focus of a series of reports that highlighted
their inefficiency and inequality (for example, see Davidson 2012; Den-
niss 2007; Henry 2009; Ingles 2009; Spies-Butcher & Stebbing 2009).
Most notably, the Henry Tax Review – which Labor framed as a blue-
print for future tax reform – proposed that the tax concession for super
contributions be converted into a flat rate tax offset for up to $25,000 of
annual contributions (Henry 2009, p. 100). Nevertheless, there is little
to suggest that Labor supports more systematic reform beyond that de-
livered by the Rudd–Gillard government.
Labor’s lack of appetite for reform seems to stem from the fact
that the super tax concessions are established policies that have a low
profile and receive support from well-resourced interests. As tax expen-
ditures, the inequity of these concessions is concealed and they tend
to be viewed as tax cuts for ‘self-funded retirees’ (Henman & Marston
2008, p. 192). The low profile of the super tax concessions has not
been redressed by the annual publication of the Tax Expenditures State-
ment since 1986 as it provides limited information and does not report
distributive effects (see Burton 2005). At the same time, these tax con-
cessions enjoy quasi-legitimacy due to their long history. As Pierson
(1993) argues, policies that operate over the long term tend to become
resistant to reform as they come to inform the expectations of benefi-
ciaries. Reform that reduced the inequity of the super tax concessions
could be expected to be unpopular among financial entities that may
expect to receive fewer deposits and those voters that would, or expect
to, pay more tax. It is thus unsurprising that key representatives of pri-
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vate super funds and the finance industry – including the Association
of Super Funds of Australia (ASFA), the Self-Managed Superannuation
Professionals Association and the Financial Services Council – have re-
cently reaffirmed their support for these concessions (Hepworth 2012;
Korporaal 2012). Focusing on benefits received by self-funded retirees
rather than the finance industry, these associations framed the conces-
sions as vital to reducing dependence on the age pension and advocated
their extension (Korporaal 2012). Against this backdrop, the prospect
of reform to the super tax concessions appears very limited indeed.
Another priority for reform that would increase income security
in retirement is to amend the Super Guarantee to reduce both gender
inequality and the extent of the investment risks borne by individuals.
However, the major political parties have not proposed policies to ad-
dress these inequalities that are reinforced by the current private super
arrangements. The Rudd and Gillard governments focused their super-
annuation policy on increasing the Super Guarantee contribution rate
to 12 percent of employees’ wages, which has been a long-term Labor
goal that was first flagged by the Keating government. The Coalition
parties have largely supported this reform; although the Coalition did
not vote to increase the Super Guarantee, Prime Minister Tony Ab-
bott promised to retain the reform when Opposition leader (Franklin
& Hepworth 2012). In office, the Abbott government has delayed the
increase to the Super Guarantee to beyond its first term, but claims to
still support the policy (Martin & Hutchens 2014). Ironically, consid-
ering it was used to justify the increase by the Rudd government, the
Henry Review explicitly advised against raising the contributions level
of the Super Guarantee because it was likely to disadvantage low-in-
come earners (Henry 2009, p. 109). In fact, Labor’s move to raise the
Super Guarantee is likely to exacerbate gender inequality, as well as
the inequalities between low-and high-income earners discussed previ-
ously. At the same time, this reform has also increased the investment
risks borne by the majority of Australians who hold super in accumula-
tion accounts and does not prevent super from being used for purposes
other than retirement income. This implies that recent reform to the
Super Guarantee has not just failed to address shortcomings of current
policy, but has actually reinforced them.
So, will future reform address the major issues with private retire-
ment incomes policy? On balance, it does not seem likely, but time will
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ultimately tell. What is clear, however, is that the current scale and in-
equality of the super tax concessions is a largely unnoticed by-product
of the privatisation of retirement incomes policy. It is also clear that it
is premature, as the government proposes, to increase the Super Guar-
antee to 12 percent of wages when the inequalities of private super have
not been addressed. From a policy perspective, reform to these conces-
sions could do so much to enhance the efficiency of retirement incomes
policy, while simultaneously reducing budgetary pressures and improv-
ing equity.
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